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 The Changing Face of American
 Corporate Law Practice
 by
 John FLOOD *
 Introduction.
 The professions of the 1980s are completely different from the
 situation in the 1930s. They are now subject to the norms of business
 rather than the standards of professionalism.1 It is part of the pur
 pose of this article to show that the practice of law has become a
 business like any other business activity. As a result of this trans
 formation, the norms and standards so often identified with the
 professions have eroded.
 In the next part of the article, I outline some of the demographic
 changes that have taken place in the legal profession and the reasons
 for them. This is followed by a discussion of how the large corporate
 law firm operates,2 using two case studies : an example of anti
 trust litigation and the restructuring of an international corporation.
 The Demographic Profile.
 The legal profession in the United States is huge. In 1985 there
 were 655,191 lawyers, an increase of 21 percent since the beginning
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 of the decade.3 The vast majority of these, over 70 percent, are in
 private practice. This works out to one lawyer for every 513 members
 of the population.4
 If we look at the growth of the lawyer population against that of
 the general population in the U.S. since 1870, we see that from 1870
 to 1970 the two have paralleled each other fairly closely, except for
 two slight rises in 1900 and 1940. In 1870 lawyers numbered
 40.000; by 1900 the number had nearly tripled to 115.000; and by 1970
 the number had reached 300.000, from which point it has skyrocketed.5
 The present legal profession population is by no means a homo
 geneous mass. The majority of lawyers are in private practice (70 ?/o),
 with just under half of them in solo practice. The next largest pro
 portion (11.2 ?/o) is found in law firms of 51 and above lawyers.6
 These proportions represent a decline in solo practice being compen
 sated by a rise in corporate practice. Table 1 illustrates the changes
 in these proportions since 1960.
 table 1
 Private Practitioners by Practice Setting (Selected Years)
 1960: % Solo ?/o Firm Total
 All Lawyers (N = 285,933). 46 26 72
 Practitioners (N = 206,000). 64 36 100
 1970:
 All Lawyers (N = 355,242). 35 33 68
 Practitioners (N = 240,000). 52 48 100
 1980:
 All Lawyers (N = 542205). 33 35 68
 Practitioners (N = 370,111). 49 51 100
 (Reprinted with permission from Barbara A. Curran et al., The Lawyer
 Statistical Report: A Statistical Profile of the U.S. Legal Profession in the 1980s,
 Chicago : American Bar Foundation, 1985, p. 14).
 Whereas in 1960 solo practice claimed 64 percent of private practi
 tioners, by 1980 more than half were engaged in firm practice.
 Why the legal profession has grown so markedly still largely
 remains unsolved. But to some extent we can speculate that the
 twin forces of economy and state should have exercised considerable
 influence ? through increased business activity and state regula
 tion of affairs ? on this growth in lawyers' numbers.
 One of the most startling increases in the past fifteen years has
 been the rise of the large corporate law firm. Though this type of
 n? 35 - f?vrier 1988
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 firm is in a minority in absolute numbers,7 its influence is overarch
 ing. Some firms are now composed of upwards of 400 lawyers : the
 largest law firm in the world, Baker and McKenzie, with at least
 750 lawyers, and offices in most of the major cities of the world, is
 predicted to expand its numbers into the thousand range by the last
 decade of the century. These large firms are also huge enterprises in
 their own right like the corporations they serve. In 1985 Skadden,
 Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom had gross revenues of $ 169 million. 8
 Since, historically, elite lawyers have been in the vanguard of the
 development of the American legal profession 9 ? as in forming the
 Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1870 and the Ameri
 can Bar Association in 1878 10 ? and typically have clustered in large
 corporate firms, their importance in both the polity and the economy
 cannot be overestimated.11 The era of ? mega-lawyering ?, as Marc
 Galanter has called it,12 is qualitatively different from that which
 preceded it. Mega-law firms are similar in scope and size to the orga
 nizations for which they work.13
 The Structure of Large Law Firms.
 Large law firms are broadly divided along the lines of partners ?
 the members and owners of the firm ? and associates who are
 employed by the partnership.14 To explain how the system operates
 I will start with the associates and progress upwards to the part
 ners. 15 Associates are hired from law school : there is no intervening
 period of apprenticeship, for shortly after graduating from law school
 the associate will take the state bar examination and, on passing,
 will be admitted to the bar.16
 There is currently a shortage of law school graduates for the elite
 bar. A firm such as Shadden, Arps, a leader in the mergers and acqui
 sitions field, has 526 lawyers of whom 404 are associates. Skadden,
 Arps, like other firms, has to compete in a shrinking market of qua
 lified law school graduates; 17 thus salary wars break out. In 1985
 when a single firm on Wall Street, Cravath, Swaine and Moore,
 decided to raise its starting salary to $ 65,000 dollars per annum, other
 firms, however reluctant, were forced to increase their salaries by
 similar proportions.
 These salary wars create tensions both within firms and between
 firms. Once such an increase is put into effect, other more senior
 associates must receive raises also. These increases are paid for in
 one of two ways : either the extra cost is passed on to clients in the
 form of higher billing rates, or, to avoid raising billing rates, the
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 partners can reduce the size of their draws. Tensions between firms
 arise when a firm decides not to institute the increase. This can
 spur an exodus of associates from the firm to others. Even though
 the increase may happen in only one city, such as New York, it will
 have effects in other major centres almost immediately. For example,
 Skadden, Arps has offices in several cities in the United States.
 Contrary to what most other multi-state firms do, Skadden, Arps
 pays its associates the same salary regardless of location, which
 can be significant when New York firms generally pay around $ 10,000
 to $ 15,000 per annum more than say Chicago firms.
 Firms have two basic ways of remunerating partners, namely,
 lockstep and merit. The former is remuneration based entirely on
 seniority without regard to how many clients one controls. Merit pay,
 however, rewards an individual partner on the basis of how many
 clients that partner is responsible for and how many hours the part
 ner bills in a year. More and more, firms are switching to the latter
 mode of remuneration. One reason for this change is that, whilst in
 previous years partners stayed with the firm they first made partner
 at, inter-firm mobility has increased tremendously. A firm such as
 Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson and
 Casey is largely composed of lateral hires from other firms on the
 promise of greater earnings than could be expected under the lock
 step tradition.
 Firm loyalty is in decline. Firms are also not averse to removing
 partners who do not generate sufficient work for the firm. Besides
 those who prove incompetent for one reason or another, those who
 have specialized in a particular field are especially vulnerable. For
 example, specialists in air transport regulation have suffered since
 the Reagan administration deregulated the field.
 The Work of Corporate Law Firms.
 What then do large law firms do ? In some respects this is a dif
 ficult question to answer for the simple reason that, except for jour
 nalistic accounts, few data exist. The kinds of fields of law which
 these lawyers practice in tell us little about what they actually do.
 But some sketch of these should be drawn. Most large firms' expert
 ise is in corporate work, e.g., complex contracts, international busi
 ness, and large-scale litigation. Regardless of the dispute over whether
 there has in recent years been a litigation explosion,18 large law
 firms are geared to running large law suits over a period of years.
 N? 35 - FIiVRIER 1988
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 In his book, The Partners,19 Stewart presents in detail, although
 somewhat overdrawn in histrionic style, several cases of law firms'
 involvement in transactions and litigation, e.g., the refinancing of
 Chrysler, and the IBM anti-trust suit. Both of these case studies
 demonstrate the peculiar talents of the large corporate law firm.
 Large-scale litigation requires intensive use of manpower over
 extended periods of time. The IBM anti-trust suit involved legions of
 lawyers in what was effectively one case that lasted for the better
 part of a decade.20 IBM was charged with monopolizing the hard
 ware part of the computer industry under section 2 of the Sherman
 Act. 21 The U.S. government suit came on the heels of several private
 actions instituted by smaller computer firms.22 The effect of this
 multiplicity of suits was to put IBM under siege; it was attacked by
 different types of organizations spread across the country.
 IBM relied on its outside counsel, Cravath, Swaine and Moore, to
 handle the litigation. Given the multiplicity and geographical diver
 sity of the suits, IBM, through Cravath, had to employ other law
 firms to act as local counsel, though at all times Cravath held the
 position of lead counsel which would devise and control the strate
 gies adopted in the litigation. Cravath set up its litigation headquart
 ers at the White Plains head office of IBM. As the cases progressed,
 more and more associates were drafted onto the IBM case.
 The private and government actions against IBM effectively inter
 locked; a win in one would redound to the benefit of the other. When
 the first suit, a private one brought by Control Data Corporation
 (CDC), was started, Cravath replied with a series of discovery requests
 Cravath gave CDC's lawyers more documents than they could absorb.
 As Stewart points out, there was a crucial difference in the methods
 of the two sets of lawyers. Cravath had known what was in each of
 the documents it had produced; conversely, CDC's lawyers did not
 read every document they handed to Cravath. When the Cravath
 team combed the CDC documents, they discovered evidence of a plan
 by CRC to join a consortium that would have acted to fix prices
 and arrange markets to suborn IBM. When CDC's lawyers realized
 the information Cravath possessed, they agreed to settle.
 At this stage only two partners and four associates were assigned
 to the litigation. When Cravath lost one of the cases against Telex
 with a $ 350 million verdict against IBM, IBM insisted that more
 lawyers be put on to the cases. In all, there were three partners, about
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 twenty associates, and a considerable amount of help from IBM.
 The verdict against IBM stimulated the government into pressing
 forward its case. As discovery progressed, Cravath took somewhere in
 the region of a thousand depositions of witnesses. The government
 asked for 760 million IBM documents. Although the government
 sought a trial date in 1974, it was not until 1976 that the trial proper
 began, seven years after the U.S. Attorney General signed the com
 plaint. Part of Cravath's strategy was to set up an office in the South
 ern District of New York near the trial court and to form teams
 around the broad issues of the case, such as ? market structure ?
 and ? acts and practices, ? which would prepare the appropriate parts
 of the case as those witnesses came to testify. Only the partners,
 however, were allowed to speak in court.
 While the government case was in progress, so were other private
 suits against IBM. Cravath was forced to set up satellite teams cons
 tructed out of its government team. These satellite teams travelled
 around the country as and when trials began. Some of these private
 actions were on trial for several months. For example, a suit brought
 by Calcomp lasted for ten months. Perhaps this is one of the salient
 points about this type of litigation; it drags on for years. Again, for
 example, one of the government witnesses spent a total of seven
 months on the witness stand.
 By 1980, Cravath had won all the private cases, either at trial or
 on appeal, and by 1981 it had presented its case in the government
 matter. At this time the Reagan administration had taken over from
 that of President Carter. And it was characterized by a libertarian,
 free-market economic policy, in contrast to the previous administra
 tion's intervention into the marketplace. Rather than drag the case
 out interminably the government entered settlement discussions, and
 in 1981 the case was dismissed.
 Even within a large firm such as Cravath ? currently with 230
 lawyers ? such an intensive and extensive series of interconnected
 cases takes an enormous toll on a law firm. There is a danger that
 a single client comes to dominate the firm. And as client loyalties
 are becoming diluted as more legal jobs are being taken in-house
 by corporations, to rely one one or a few large clients can prove
 risky. Moreover, a single case like the IBM suit can distort the growth
 of a law firm, for while the case is in progress many associates are
 hired into the litigation department, but there is a danger that once
 the case is finished there may be a shortage of work for them. Some
 of these dangers reappear in the next case study of Chrysler Automo
 tive Corporation's restructuring.
 n? 35 - fSvrier 1988
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 ii. Restructuring and Bankruptcy.
 At the end of the 1970s Chrysler was facing imminent collapse.
 The automobile company had not changed its production from heavy,
 thirsty motor cars suitable to the period of cheap gasoline to lighter,
 more efficient models. As a result the company's inventory was too
 high and its sales were dismally low; and in 1979 Chrysler lost $ 1.1
 billion dollars.24 In order to prevent a massive bankruptcy, Congress
 passed the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979. The act
 stipulated that if certain conditions were met, the government would
 guarantee funds for Chrysler.
 To shepherd the company through the labyrinth of these conditions,
 Chrysler hired Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons and Gates (now Debe
 voise and Plimpton), a large Wall Street law firm. The central requi
 rement of the restructuring of Chrysler was that all of Chrysler's
 and Chrysler Finance Company's (a subsidiary that financed customer
 loans) debtors relinquish the primacy of their interests in favor of
 the government. Manufacturers Hanover Corporation, a large bank,
 was the main debtor, with over $ 55 million in debts outstanding. But
 there were also around 400 other banks, large and small, in the U.S.,
 Canada, Europe, and Japan which were owed large sums of money.
 Any one of them could claim a default on Chrysler's part and force
 Chrysler into bankruptcy, which would inflict huge losses on all cre
 ditors. It was in everyone's interest to keep Chrysler afloat.
 Debevoise was taken on in part because it had no major bank as a
 client and was therefore free of any potential conflicts of interest.
 As with the IBM anti-trust litigation, the Chrysler restructuring would
 require an enormous committment of labor from Debevoise. Unlike
 Cravath, Debevoise had a firm rule that no single client could claim
 more than 15 percent of the firm's resources : it was obvious to the
 partnership that Chrysler would breach this rule. Nevertheless, the
 law firm agreed to be lead counsel for Chrysler.
 In negotiating with banks in four parts of the world, Debevoise
 encountered many cultural and political problems. The Japanese
 concept of honor demanded that Japanese banks help Japanese cor
 porations when they were in trouble. Thus the Japanese failed to
 understand why the American banks were not assisting Chrysler.
 They suspected the government of providing better conditions for
 American banks than Japanese ones. The Canadian banks, too, were
 suspicious, an attitude hardened by many years of Canadian mis
 trust of the United States. The Canadian banks' loans were secured
 by rights to the assets of Chrysler's subsidiary, unlike most of the
 American banks' loans which were unsecured. The Canadian banks
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 were determined to keep this advantage. Their first step was to
 freeze $ 50 million dollars of Chrysler's deposits in Canada. The
 American banks were convinced that the Canadians were receiving an
 unfair benefit and Debevoise had to persuade them not to scuttle the
 entire restructuring because of the freeze. Eventually, Debevoise had
 to assign a senior partner full-time to the Canadian negotiations.
 The only true bargaining counter Debevoise possessed was the
 threat that Chrysler would go bankrupt, thereby defaulting on its
 loans. At certain stages in the negotiations with the banks and the
 U.S. Treasury, the threat appeared imminent without the willing
 agency of Chrysler. Chrysler was fast running out of money. A trans
 fusion of $ 100 million from Peugeot, although having the appearance
 of a loan, had to be dressed as a sale; Peugeot could not have first
 priority on the stock which the ? loan ? was secured against since the
 U.S. government had priority over all others. Added to these difficul
 ties was the problem Debevoise had in determining the exact size
 of Chrysler's likely loss for the year. Every time the figure was esta
 blished, it changed for the worse, but some degree of accuracy was
 essential to satisfy both the Treasury and the Securities and Exchange
 Commission that the prospectus would be truthful.
 When Debevoise reached a tentative agreement with the banks
 and the Treasury, it began the drafting of the documents that would
 tie the entire deal together. One hundred and fifty lawyers from
 ten law firms worked on the drafting.
 Though the great majority of the banks agreed to the terms, three
 attempted to go their own route by filing lawsuits which Debevoise
 had to delay and finally to invoke the help of the Treasury Secretary
 to dispel the banks' fears. Piece by piece, the transaction was com
 ing to a close : the European and Japanese banks agreed, but the
 Canadian banks would not. Ultimately, it took the efforts of the
 two governments to reconcile the differences.
 When the loan guarantee application was accepted by the Treasury,
 the closing could occur. Since this closing would require hundreds
 of signatories signing thousand of documents, it was spread over
 three law firms in Wall Street.
 Discussion and Conclusion.
 The lawyers in the case studies here are highly sophisticated tech
 nicians. And this is the core of mega-lawyers' work. They construct
 complex transactions so that every contingency is accounted for. It
 may be drafting a series of interlocking documents as in the Chrysler
 case; or it may be manipulating procedural matters so as to confound
 n? 35 - f^vrier 1988
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 the opposition as in the IBM litigation. Cravath and Debevoise could
 quickly introduce large quantities of manpower to cope with exigen
 cies. This ability can easily overwhelm, and is often intended to, the
 opposing parties' lawyers, whether they be private practitioners or
 government lawyers. Either a problem can be dragged out for an
 extended time as in IBM, or it can be telescoped as in Chrysler.
 These two case studies illustrate the capacities of and the exigen
 cies faced by large corporate law firms. Individual lawyers and the
 firms they work for must tolerate immense pressures over extended
 lengths of time. In both situations discussed, the firms were profound
 ly affected by the changes wrought by the nature of these cases. Both
 firms breached intra-firm rules ? creating separate offices for IBM
 and committing more than 15 percent of the firm's resources to
 Chrysler ? that had guided their development. But such firms as
 Cravath and Debevoise exist to serve the needs of capital and though
 they may desire to retain a certain status quo ante, they are, however,
 not immune to the economic pressures that capital exerts, for good
 or ill. Yet business and the professions are held to different standards
 and treated differently by the state. But given the intricate web of
 connections that exist between the professions ? especially those
 of law and accountancy ? and commerce and industry, it is surpris
 ing perhaps that the professions have managed to maintain for so
 long the idea that they are unsullied by the norms of business and
 consequently should possess the privilege of regulating themselves
 without community interference.25
 In some respects large law firms are coming to resemble their
 clients. Whereas law firms grew by taking in a class of associates
 each year, training them, and eventually conferring the mantle of
 partner on them, they now merge with and take over other law firms
 in order to acquire missing expertise and extend their client bases.26
 Partners are raised by other firms for their client-getting abilities.
 Firms, which were once considered stable entities as partners remain
 ed with the same firm for life, are now becoming shifting congeries
 of profit centres that will exist as long as expedient.
 Who then are lawyers beholden to ? Where do their fiduciary inter
 ests lie ? The answer may not be easily sought: though lawyers move
 from firm to firm with their clients, they use the client base they have
 established as a resource to assist them in gaining and maintaining
 power within the context of the firm. Power gives them the ability
 to claim more money, more lawyers working on their client matters,
 and to set policy in the firm. There is an intertwining of needs and
 benefits that feed into and reinforce each other. One commentator
 expressed the sentiment thus :
 REVUE FRANQAISE D'gTUDES AM&UCAINES
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Thu, 26 May 2016 14:28:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 64  john flood
 The large law firm has now become an American institution
 in itself. Lawyers in big firms are no longer accountable to indi
 vidual clients. Rather, they are accountable to their law firm.
 Law firms are the entity, not the individual. The objective of
 the large law firm is simply to make money and to grow
 bigger in order to make more money. To a large extent, the
 client has been left out in the cold.2?
 If such is the case, and the evidence strongly suggests that the com
 mercialization of the elite bar is taking place, the privileges accorded
 to the traditional concept of the bar are no longer appropriate and
 the conventional modes fo community response to the legal profes
 sion are historically out of kilter with the modern reality.
 To some extent, external regulation of the bar has already occurred.
 Both the Internal Revenue Service and the Securities and Exchange
 Commission have issued rules on what constitutes proper behavior
 for those attorneys who practice before them. Moreover, they now
 take disciplinary action against lawyers who infringe their practice
 rules.28 External regulation of this kind, however, is anathema to the
 concept of a self-regulating profession. But within the confines of the
 bar itself, the trends show a disquieting move. Complaints, involv
 ing lawyers' fees, to state bar disciplinary agencies jumped from 39,000
 in 1984 to 54,000 in 1985. 2*
 Finally, though the case studies only hinted at this phenomenon,
 the practice of corporate law has become heavily routinized. The
 documents drafted by the teams of lawyers at Debevoise were mostly
 taken from standard forms everpresent on the word processor.
 Although changes are made to fit the specific situation, no document
 is drafted from point zero. Much of the discovery process involving
 many highly priced associates entails examining boxes of intra-com
 pany memoranda to determine whether they should be seen by the
 other side, which requires no legal skills. Much of this kind of work
 is now performed by paralegals who are considerably cheaper than
 associates.30 The general counsel to Arthur Young and Company, one
 of the Big Eight accounting firms, asserted : ? While I cannot empi
 rically prove my next statement, in twenty years of having been
 exposed to the law, I believe that 65 percent of what most lawyers do
 can be done by non-lawyers and should be done by non-lawyers ?
 whether that is a computer, a paralegal or some other support
 staff. ? 31
 Large law firms, corporate practice, mega-lawyering, whatever we
 call the Leviathan, is a response to the needs and contingencies of
 capitalism in the late twentieth century. But the ethos of professiona
 lism that Carr-Saunders and Wilson 32 could write about so securely
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 in the 1930s no longer has any meaning within the present organiza
 tion of law practice. New forms demand new modes of arrangement
 and theorizing. Perhaps the words of Carl Liggio, are an apposite
 epilogue to this essay: Most lawyers think of themselves first and
 foremost as lawyers, when in reality, they are a very small part of
 a much larger profession or industry. That industry is the industry
 of information management33.
 NOTES
 * / would like to thank Lucinda J. Peach and Mary L. Coyne for their
 comments on earlier drafts of this article.
 1. For the story medicine see Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of
 American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a
 Vast Industry, New York: Basic Books, 1982.
 2. Certain words are used interchangeably here. Large law firms are considered
 the elite members of the bar by the nature of their clients and the work they
 do for them. Sometimes I use corporate law firm instead of large law firm;
 it is to emphasize that the firms work for corporations.
 3. Barbara A. Curran, Supplement to the Lawyer Statistical Report: the U.S.
 Legal Profession in 1985, Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1986.
 4. Id.
 5. Terence C. Halliday, ? Six Score and Ten: Demographic Transitions in the
 Legal Profession, 1850-1980,? Law and Society Review, vol. 20, p. 53, 1986.
 6. Op. cit., Curran.
 7. In 1985 law firms of 51 lawyers or more accounted for 1.2 percent of all
 firms (N = 42318), but the same firms employed 11.2 percent of all private
 practitioners. Curran, Supplement, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
 8. ? The AmLaw 75: America's Seventy-Five Highest Grossing Firms, ?
 American Lawyer, November 1986, chart.
 9. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, ? Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the
 Age of American Enterprise, 187CM920,? in Gerald L. Geison, ed., Professions
 and Professional Ideologies in America, Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North
 Carolina Press, 1983, p. 70.
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 10. See Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, St. Paul,
 Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1953, p. 254 passim.
 11. This is especially true as we enter the postmodern age of fragmented
 communities no longer tied together by common interests. See Jean-Francois
 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Minneapolis:
 University of Minnesota Press, 1983.
 12. Marc Galanter, ?Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary
 United State,? in Robert Dingwall and Philip Lewis, eds., The Sociology of the
 Professions: Lawyers, Doctors and Others, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983,
 p. 152.
 13. Cf. John P. Heinz and Edward O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social
 Structure of the Bar, New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Chicago:
 American Bar Foundation, 1982; and Robert L. Nelson, Practice and Privilege:
 The Social Organization of Large Law Firms, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation,
 Sociology Northwestern University, 1983.
 14. Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed.) defines ? partnership ? as : ? A vol
 luntary contract between two or more competent persons to place their money,
 effects, labor, and skill, [...] in lawful commerce or business, with the under
 standing that there shall be a proportional sharing of the profits and losses
 between them.?
 15. Besides these two categories, law firms hire enormous staffs of paralegals,
 law clerks, secretaries, librarians, messengers, and accountants.
 16. Note that each state administers its own bar examination and determines
 the rules for eligibility of entry. In most states passing the examination entitles
 one to begin practice immediately. Vermont, for example, requires several
 months of clerking in an attorney's office.
 17. Members of the elite bar avoid taking graduates from the lower ranks
 of law schools.
 18. Cf. Marc Galanter, ? Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
 and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
 Litigious Society,? UCLA Law Review, vol. 31, 1983, p. 4.
 19. James B. Stewart, The Partners: Inside America's Most Powerful Law
 Firms, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.
 20. Stewart, op. cit., ?IBM: Cravath, Swaine and Moore,? pp. 53-113.
 21. 15 U.S.C. s. 2 (1890).
 22. Private actions are brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act. For a
 more prosaic rendition of an anti-trust case see, Dorsey Ellis, Jr. and James
 E. Meeks, Trial of an Anti-Trust Case, Chicago: American Bar Association
 Sections of Litigation and Antitrust Law, 1977.
 23. Discovery is the process whereby each side to a dispute is required by
 law to hand over copies of documents requested by the other side. A lawyer's
 work product is usually exempted. Document production is often a precursor
 to deposing potential witnesses in a case. The theory behind discovery is to
 accelerate the suit and to avoid surprise at trial: it removes again in theory,
 the game element from a trial, but as we shall see, it frequently introduces its
 own game elements. See, also, Wayne D. Brazil, ? Views from the Front Lines:
 Observations by Chicago Lawyers about the System of Civil Discovery, ? American
 Bar Foundation Research Journal, n? 4, p. 217, 1980.
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 24. Stewart, op. cit., ?Chrysler: Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons and Gate,?
 pp. 201-44.
 25. An interesting, but related, sideshow was presented during the recent
 federal investigation of the state judiciary (? Operation Greylord ?), in Cook
 County, Illinois. Every single lawyer who gave information about corrupt
 activities did so only after he was theatened with prosecution. None volunteered
 information. See also Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social
 Change in Modern America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1976; and
 James C. Foster, The Ideology of Apolitical Politics: The Elite Lawyers'
 Response to the Legitimation Crisis in American Capitalism: 1870-1920, New
 York: Associated Faculty Press, 1986.
 26. See Mark Stevens, ? Breaking " The Code ": Finley, Kumble and the Cult
 of the Rainmakers,? in Power of Attorney: The Rise of the Giant Law Firms,
 New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987, pp. 37-68.
 39. Peter M. Brown, ?Remarks : The Changing Nature on the Practice of
 Law,? Federal Bar Council, 1984 Bench and Bar Conference Proceedings, Dorado,
 Puerto Rico, p. 90.
 28. E.g., see Paul J. Routh, ? Liabilities of a Tax Preparer: An Overview,?
 Capital University Law Review, vol. 13, pp. 479-519 (1984).
 29. U.S. News, March 2, 1987, p. 27. No breakdown as to size of practice is
 supplied, however.
 30. Quintin Johnstone and Martin Wenglinsky, Paralegals: Progress and
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